Report NEP-EXP-2008-03-15

This is the archive for NEP-EXP, a report on new working papers in the area of Experimental Economics. Daniel Houser issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-EXP

The following items were announced in this report:

• Leuven, Edwin & Oosterbeek, Hessel & Sonnemans, Joep & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2008. "Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 3326, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
• Antonio Cabrales & Raffaele Miniaci & Marco Piovesan & Giovanni Ponti, 2008. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts," Discussion Papers 08-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
• Hörisch, Hannah & Strassmair, Christina, 2008. "An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 229, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
• Gaudecker, Hans-Martin von & van Soest, Arthur & Wengström, Erik, 2008. "Selection and Mode Effects in Risk Preference Elicitation Experiments," IZA Discussion Papers 3321, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
• Ondrej Rydval, & Andreas Ortmann & Michal Ostatnicky, 2008. "Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp347, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
• L. Bagnoli & G. Negroni, 2008. "A remark on the experimental evidence from tacit coordination games," Working Papers 627, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
• Eike B. Kroll & Bodo Vogt, 2008. "Attraction to Chance in Germany and Australia. An experimental study of cultural differences," FEMM Working Papers 08006, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
• Brown, Martin & Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2008. "Competition and Relational Contracts: The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary Device," IZA Discussion Papers 3345, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).