Report NEP-DES-2024-04-29

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Guillaume Haeringer issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Elliott, M. & Galeotti, A. & Koh, A. & Li, W., 2023. "Matching and Information Design in Marketplaces," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2304, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
• Kirill Rudov, 2024. "Fragile Stable Matchings," Papers 2403.12183, arXiv.org.
• Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori & Claudia Meo, 2024. "Symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems," Papers 2404.01404, arXiv.org.
• Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2024.
• Peyman Khezr & Vijay Mohan & Lionel Page, 2024. "Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions," Papers 2403.07928, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
• Clayton Thomas, 2024. "Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive," Papers 2404.02142, arXiv.org.
• Luca Anderlini & GaOn Kim, 2024. "Tournament Auctions," Papers 2403.08102, arXiv.org.
• Ian Ball & Teemu Pekkarinen, 2024. "Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification," Papers 2403.19945, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
• Triêu, Anh & Bos, Iwan & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries, 2024. "Maximal matchings," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).