Report NEP-DES-2023-06-12

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Giacomo Rubbini, 2023. "Mechanism Design without Rational Expectations," Papers 2305.07472, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
• Ceesay, Muhammed, 2023. "Suspecting Collusion," EconStor Preprints 270874, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
• Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "On extensions of partial priorities in school choice," Papers 2305.00641, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
• Barelli, Paulo & Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2022. "Strategic Foundations of Rational Expectations," Research Papers 4042, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.