Report NEP-DES-2023-05-15

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee & David Malec, 2023. "Flow Trading," NBER Working Papers 31098, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2023. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," Papers 2304.07653, arXiv.org.
• Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Nicholas Wu, 2023. "How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?," Papers 2304.08432, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
• Bolotnyy, Valentin & Vasserman, Shoshana, 2023. "Scaling Auctions as Insurance: A Case Study in Infrastructure Procurement," Research Papers 3887, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
• Alex Gershkov & Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2023. "Voting With Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_414, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2023. "Order Independence in Sequential, Issue-by-Issue Voting," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_413, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "Social Welfare Functions with Voters Qualifications: Impossibility Results," Papers 2304.06961, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
• David Lowing & Makoto Yokoo, 2023. "Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach," Working Papers hal-04018735, HAL.
• Xi Chen & Binghui Peng, 2023. "Complexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules," Papers 2303.16388, arXiv.org.