Report NEP-DES-2022-11-28

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Itzhak Rasooly, 2022. "Competitive equilibrium and the double auction," Economics Series Working Papers 974, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
• Yi-Chun Chen & Gaoji Hu & Xiangqian Yang, 2022. "Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification," Papers 2210.16001, arXiv.org.
• Alexei Parakhonyak & Anton Sobolev, 2022. "Persuasion without Priors," Economics Series Working Papers 977, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
• Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2022. "Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences," Papers 2210.12794, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
• Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-084/I, Tinbergen Institute.
• Yotam Gafni & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2022. "Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions," Papers 2210.15181, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
• Péter Eso & Chris Wallace, 2022. "Evidence Disclosure in Competitive Markets," Economics Series Working Papers 980, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.