Report NEP-DES-2022-10-31

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Sushil Bikhchandani & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models," Papers 2209.10137, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
• Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2022. "Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 2022-24, Princeton University. Economics Department..
• Jean-François Houde & Terence R. Johnson & Molly Lipscomb & Laura A. Schechter, 2022. "Imperfect Competition and Sanitation: Evidence from Randomized Auctions in Senegal," NBER Working Papers 30514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Sümeyra Atmaca & Riccardo Camboni & Elena Podkolzina & Koen Schoors & Paola Valbonesi, 2022. "Setting reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0289, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
• Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
• Luofeng Liao & Yuan Gao & Christian Kroer, 2022. "Statistical Inference for Fisher Market Equilibrium," Papers 2209.15422, arXiv.org.
• Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2022. "Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals," TSE Working Papers 22-1364, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).