Report NEP-DES-2021-02-15

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.

Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Ostrovsky, Michael, 2020. "Choice Screen Auctions," Research Papers 3912, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
• Pablo Guillen & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets," Working Papers 1913, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
• Bary S R Pradelski & Heinrich H Nax, 2020. "Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies," Post-Print hal-03100116, HAL.
• Marina Agranov & Ahrash Dianat & Larry Samuelson & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions," CESifo Working Paper Series 8820, CESifo.
• Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Informed Information Design," Working Papers halshs-03107866, HAL.