Report NEP-DES-2020-11-30

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Muhammad Maaz, 2020. "Saturating stable matchings," Papers 2011.06046, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, V., 2020. "Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
• Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2020. "Obviously Strategy-proof Implementation of Assignment Rules: A New Characterization," MPRA Paper 104044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Wu, Haoyang, 2020. "The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action," MPRA Paper 104171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Olivier Bos & Tom Truyts, 2020. "Auctions with Signaling Concerns," CESifo Working Paper Series 8650, CESifo.
• Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass & Achim Wambach, 2020. "Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_225v1, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy, 2020. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Working Papers 2020-08, CRESE.