Report NEP-DES-2020-10-05

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Komal Malik & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity," Papers 2009.12114, arXiv.org.
• Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Alexander Nesterov, 2020. "Reforms meet fairness concerns in school and college admissions," Papers 2009.05245, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
• Samuel Dooley & John P. Dickerson, 2020. "The Affiliate Matching Problem: On Labor Markets where Firms are Also Interested in the Placement of Previous Workers," Papers 2009.11867, arXiv.org.
• Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Amin Saberi & Clayton Thomas & Geng Zhao, 2020. "Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity," Papers 2009.05124, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
• Jun Zhang, 2020. "Strategy-proof allocation with outside option," Papers 2009.05311, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
• Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
• Christos Papadimitriou & Kiran Vodrahalli & Mihalis Yannakakis, 2020. "The Platform Design Problem," Papers 2009.06117, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
• Matthew J. Walker & Elena Katok & Jason Shachat, 2020. "Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage," Working Papers 20-34, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.