Report NEP-DES-2020-01-20

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, "undated". "Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1001r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2020.
• Jingfeng Lu & Zongwei Lu & Christian Riis, 2019. "Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request," Papers 1912.03607, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
• Teemu Pennanen, 2020. "Efficient allocations in double auction markets," Papers 2001.02071, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
• Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2019. "Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities," MPRA Paper 97698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Simon P. Anderson & Martin Peitz, 2019. "Media See-Saws: Winners and Losers in Platform Markets," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_089v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.