Report NEP-DES-2019-09-02

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Daniel Lehmann, 2019. "Revealed Preferences for Matching with Contracts," Papers 1908.08823, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2020.
• Josue Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019. "Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting," Papers 1908.02988, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
• Rene van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019. "Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-062/II, Tinbergen Institute.
• Gautier, Pieter & Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Vroman, Susan, 2019. "Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 13912, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
• Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Lima, Lucas Alves Estevam de, 2019. "Mechanism design and the collective approach to household behavior," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 808, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
• Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Brent Hickman & Eric Richert, 2019. "Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design," Staff Working Papers 19-30, Bank of Canada.
• Caio Waisman & Harikesh S. Nair & Carlos Carrion, 2019. "Online Causal Inference for Advertising in Real-Time Bidding Auctions," Papers 1908.08600, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.