Report NEP-DES-2019-07-22

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Girum Abebe & Marcel Fafchamps & Michael Koelle & Simon Quinn, 2019. "Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design," NBER Working Papers 26035, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• R. Pablo Arribillaga & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2019. "All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-proof," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 966.19, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
• Eric Kamwa, 2019. "The Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Post-Print hal-01786121, HAL.
• Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Rent extraction with securities plus cash," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1212, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.