Report NEP-DES-2019-02-04

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019. "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss averse bidders," Discussion Papers 2019/1, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
• Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017. "Auctions with selective entry," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83664, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
• Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_011, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen & Sander (A.M.) Onderstal & Leonard Treuren, 2019. "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-009/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Jun 2020.