Report NEP-DES-2018-02-26

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Alex Rees-Jones & Samuel Skowronek, 2018. "An Experimental Investigation of Preference Misrepresentation in the Residency Match," Papers 1802.01990, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2018.
• John Wooders & Matt Van Essen, 2018. "Dual Auctions for Assigning Winners and Compensating Losers," Working Papers 20180013, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Jan 2018.
• Richard van Weelden, 2018. "Excluding Compromise: Negotiating Only With Polarized Interests," Working Paper 6329, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
• Damien Challet & Nikita Gourianov, 2018. "Dynamical regularities of US equities opening and closing auctions," Papers 1802.01921, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2018.
• Gersbach, Hans & Wickramage, Kamali, 2018. "Balanced Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 12672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.