Report NEP-DES-2017-10-08
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2017. "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Otheres are Doing," Vienna Economics Papers 1707, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Krumer, Alex & Megidish, Reut & Sela, Aner, 2017. "The Optimal Design of Round-Robin Tournaments with Three Players," Economics Working Paper Series 1713, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- Abhinaba Lahiri & Anup Pramanik, 2017. "On Strategy-proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives," ISER Discussion Paper 1013, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Partially-honest Nash implementation : a full characterization," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2017-15, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2016. "A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 11-2016, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.