Report NEP-DES-2017-07-02

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2017. "Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: Unanimity vs Monotonicity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01539444, HAL.
• Joosung Lee, 2017. "Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms," Working Papers 2017.27, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
• Sareh Vosooghi, 2017. "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 2017.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
• Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Working Papers 2017.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
• Robin Nicole & Peter Sollich, 2017. "Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria using Experience Weighted Attraction Learning: emergence of heterogeneous mixed equilibria," Papers 1706.09763, arXiv.org.
• Dan Usher, 2017. "Interpreting Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem," Working Paper 1384, Economics Department, Queen's University.
• Guha, Brishti, 2017. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper 79876, University Library of Munich, Germany.
• Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2017. "Strategic vote trading under complete information," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 03-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
• Margherita Negri, 2017. "Good Politicians' Distorted Incentives," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201713, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.