Report NEP-CDM-2012-09-03
This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Roland Kirstein issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon.
Other reports in NEP-CDM
The following items were announced in this report:
- Tyran, Jean-Robert & Morton, Rebecca & Piovesan, Marco, 2012. "The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 9098, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tyran, Jean-Robert & Reuben, Ernesto & Markussen, Thomas, 2012. "Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice," CEPR Discussion Papers 9099, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Zweimüller, Josef & Wagner, Alexander F. & Halla, Martin, 2012. "Immigration and Voting for the Far Right," CEPR Discussion Papers 9102, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz, 2012. "Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation," Working Papers 2012-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada, 2012. "Channeling the final Say in Politics," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 12/164, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Robson, Alex, 2012. "Transaction Costs can Encourage Coasean Bargaining," MPRA Paper 40892, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Keefer, Philip, 2012. "Why follow the leader ? collective action, credible commitment and conflict," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6179, The World Bank.
- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2012. "Behavioral Implementation," Working Papers 2012-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Derks, J. & Peters, H.J.M. & Sudhölter, P., 2012. "On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Bruce Owen, 2012. "Communication Policy Reform, Interest Groups, and Legislative Capture," Discussion Papers 11-006, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.