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Liang Mao

Personal Details

First Name:Liang
Middle Name:
Last Name:Mao
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pma2327

Affiliation

College of Economics
Shenzhen University

Shenzhen, China
http://bs.szu.edu.cn/
RePEc:edi:ifszucn (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 41-45.
  2. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
  3. Liang Mao, 2018. "A note on stable cartels," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1338-1342.
  4. Liang Mao, 2017. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(4), pages 485-500, April.
  5. Mao, Liang & Zhang, Tianyu, 2017. "A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 79-82.
  6. Mao, Liang, 2016. "The stability and efficiency of direct and star networks in a loan game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 53-60.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Liang Mao, 2018. "A note on stable cartels," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1338-1342.

    Cited by:

    1. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).

  2. Liang Mao, 2017. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(4), pages 485-500, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 41-45.
    2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2019. "Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 389-399, May.
    3. Shunsuke Hanato, 2020. "Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 463-494, June.

  3. Mao, Liang & Zhang, Tianyu, 2017. "A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 79-82.

    Cited by:

    1. Shunsuke Hanato, 2020. "Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 463-494, June.

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