Jun Honda
Personal Details
First Name: | Jun |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Honda |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pho596 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
https://sites.google.com/site/junhondaeconomics07/ | |
+81-263372341 | |
Terminal Degree: | 2015 (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
Department of Applied Economics
Faculty of Economics and Law
Shinshu University
Matsumoto, Japanhttps://www.shinshu-u.ac.jp/faculty/econlaw/department/economy/
RePEc:edi:feshnjp (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Honda, Jun & Inderst, Roman & Ottaviani, Marco, 2022.
"When Liability is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets With Advice,"
EconStor Preprints
259401, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Jun Honda & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2024. "When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(2), pages 1301-1314, February.
- Jun Honda, 2020. "Gender Gaps and Racial Disparities in Labour Market Penalties for Financial Misconduct," Working Papers 2020-17, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Jun Honda, 2020. "Career Concerns, Risk-Taking, and Upward Mobility in the Financial Services Industry: Evidence from Top Ranked Financial Advisers," Working Papers 2020-16, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Jun Honda & Roman Inderst, 2017.
"Nonlinear incentives and advisor bias,"
Working Papers
2017-26, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Inderst, Roman, 2018. "Nonlinear Incentives and Advisor Bias," CEPR Discussion Papers 12914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Honda, Jun & Inderst, Roman, 2017. "Nonlinear Incentives and Advisor Bias," EconStor Preprints 253657, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Jun Honda, 2015.
"Games with the Total Bandwagon Property,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
wuwp197, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Honda, Jun, 2015. "Games with the Total Bandwagon Property," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 197, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Jun Honda, 2015.
"Intermediary Search for Suppliers in Procurement Auctions,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
wuwp203, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Honda, Jun, 2015. "Intermediary Search for Suppliers in Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 203, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2015.
"The Double Diamond Paradox,"
Vienna Economics Papers
vie1504, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2017. "The Double Diamond Paradox," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 63-99, August.
- Honda, Jun & Takekuma, Shin-Ichi & 武隈, 愼一, 2009. "A Note on Aumann's Core Equivalence Theorem without Monotonicity," Discussion Papers 2009-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
Articles
- Jun Honda, 2018. "Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint–Shubik conjecture," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 893-912, September.
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2017.
"The Double Diamond Paradox,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 63-99, August.
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2015. "The Double Diamond Paradox," Vienna Economics Papers vie1504, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Honda, Jun, 2011. "Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 663-669.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Jun Honda, 2015.
"Intermediary Search for Suppliers in Procurement Auctions,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
wuwp203, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Honda, Jun, 2015. "Intermediary Search for Suppliers in Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 203, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
Cited by:
- Janssen, Maarten & Atayev, Atabek, 2019. "Information Acquisition and Diffusion in Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 14036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Atabek Atayev & Maarten Janssen, 2021. "Information Acquisition and Diffusion in Markets," Papers 2109.15288, arXiv.org.
- Atayev, Atabek & Janssen, Maarten C. W., 2021. "Information acquisition and diffusion in markets," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-091, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2015.
"The Double Diamond Paradox,"
Vienna Economics Papers
vie1504, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2017. "The Double Diamond Paradox," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 63-99, August.
Cited by:
- Janssen, Maarten C.W., 2020. "Vertical contracts in search markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Janssen, Maarten & Reshidi, Edona, 2022. "Regulating recommended retail prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
- Jun Honda, 2015.
"Intermediary Search for Suppliers in Procurement Auctions,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
wuwp203, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Honda, Jun, 2015. "Intermediary Search for Suppliers in Procurement Auctions," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 203, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew & Wilson, Chris M, 2020.
"Price Advertising, Double Marginalisation and Vertical Restraints,"
MPRA Paper
102621, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew & Wilson, Chris M., 2020. "Price advertising, double marginalisation and vertical restraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
- Martin Obradovits & Philipp Plaickner, 2022.
"Price-Directed Search, Product Differentiation and Competition,"
Working Papers
2022-14, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Martin Obradovits & Philipp Plaickner, 2023. "Price-Directed Search, Product Differentiation and Competition," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(3), pages 317-348, November.
- Maarten Janssen & Edona Reshidi, 2023. "Discriminatory Trade Promotions in Consumer Search Markets," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 401-422, March.
- Edona Reshidi, 2022. "Vertical Bargaining and Obfuscation," Staff Working Papers 22-13, Bank of Canada.
- Sander Heinsalu, 2018. "Competitive pricing despite search costs if lower price signals quality," Papers 1806.00898, arXiv.org.
- Garcia, Daniel & Janssen, Maarten, 2018.
"Retail channel management in consumer search markets,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 162-182.
- Garcia, Daniel & Janssen, Maarten, 2016. "Retail Channel Management in Consumer Search Markets," MPRA Paper 74394, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Obradovits, Martin, 2015. "Going to the Discounter: Consumer Search with Local Market Heterogeneities," MPRA Paper 66613, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Articles
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2017.
"The Double Diamond Paradox,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 63-99, August.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Daniel Garcia & Jun Honda & Maarten Janssen, 2015. "The Double Diamond Paradox," Vienna Economics Papers vie1504, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Honda, Jun, 2011.
"Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric 3×3 example,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 663-669.
Cited by:
- Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2010. "Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-061, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara‐Moroni, 2021. "Global Games With Strategic Substitutes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 141-173, February.
- Honda, Jun, 2015.
"Games with the Total Bandwagon Property,"
Department of Economics Working Paper Series
197, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Jun Honda, 2015. "Games with the Total Bandwagon Property," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp197, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Rodrigo Harrison & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2013.
"A Dominance Solvable Global Game with Strategic Substitutes,"
Documentos de Trabajo
440, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2015. "A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-11.
- Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2011.
"On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games,"
Working Papers
1324, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 683-688.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2019.
"Notes on "Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs","
Working Papers on Central Bank Communication
006, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Notes on “refinements and higher order beliefs”," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 35-41, January.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Notes on Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs," KIER Working Papers 1007, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R., 2011. "Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 749-754.
- Jun Honda, 2018. "Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint–Shubik conjecture," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 893-912, September.
- Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2015. "Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 100-127.
More information
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Corrections
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