Makoto Tanaka

Personal Details

First Name:	Makoto
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Tanaka
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pta190
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Economics Department
Michigan State University

East Lansing, Michigan (United States)
http://econ.msu.edu/
RePEc:edi:edmsuus (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

1. Makoto Tanaka & Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, 2002. "An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 751-761.

   Cited by:

   1. Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2018. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-01820223, HAL.
      • Fabio Galeotti, 2017. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-01657317, HAL.
      • Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2017. "The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
      • Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2020. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers halshs-02466032, HAL.
      • Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2022. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print hal-03514435, HAL.
      • Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2022. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2987-3007, April.
   2. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Some Recent Developments," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 7-41, November.
      • Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2020. "Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Some Recent Developments," Discussion Paper Series 715, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
   3. Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, 2014. "Bargaining through Approval," THEMA Working Papers 2014-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
      • Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Post-Print halshs-01310223, HAL.
      • Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168675, HAL.
      • Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
      • Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Working Papers halshs-01168675, HAL.
   4. Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver, 2023. "Compromising as an equal loss principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(3), pages 547-560, September.
      • Olivier Cailloux & Beatrice Napolitano & M. Remzi Sanver, 2022. "Compromising as an equal loss principle," Post-Print hal-03665048, HAL.
   5. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2018. "An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems," Working Papers SDES-2018-11, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2018.
      • Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2019. "An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 769-779, September.
      • Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018. "An Equitable Nash Solution to Nonconvex Bargaining Problems," Discussion Paper Series 680, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
   6. Yanhong Gu & Jing Fan & Guochun Tang & Jiaofei Zhong, 2013. "Maximum latency scheduling problem on two-person cooperative games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 71-81, July.
   7. Y. H. Gu & M. Goh & Q. L. Chen & R. D. Souza & G. C. Tang, 2013. "A new two-party bargaining mechanism," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 135-163, January.
   8. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems," Discussion Paper Series 552, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
      • Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2011. "Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems," CCES Discussion Paper Series 42, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

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