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Nicolas Figueroa

Personal Details

First Name:Nicolas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Figueroa
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfi147
http://www.dii.uchile.cl/~nicolasf
Terminal Degree:2006 Department of Economics; University of Minnesota (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Instituto de Economía
Facultad de Ciencia Económicas y Administrativas
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Santiago, Chile
https://economia.uc.cl/
RePEc:edi:iepuccl (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Nicolás Figueroa & Oksana Leukhina & Carlos Ramírez, 2018. "Imperfect Information Transmission from Banks to Investors: Macroeconomic Implications," Working Papers 2018-18, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 05 Dec 2019.
  2. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "What to Put on the Table," Working Papers 08-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  3. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Working Papers 08-12, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms," Working Papers 08-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities," 2005 Meeting Papers 866, Society for Economic Dynamics.

Articles

  1. Figueroa, Nicolás & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2009. "The role of optimal threats in auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 884-897, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "What to Put on the Table," Working Papers 08-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Galavotti, 2014. "Reducing Inefficiency in Public Good Provision Through Linking," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 427-466, June.
    2. Viviana Fernández & Brian M. Lucey, 2008. "Emerging Markets Variance Shocks: Local or International in Origin?," Documentos de Trabajo 251, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Alexandre Janiak, 2008. "Welfare in models of trade with heterogeneous firms," Documentos de Trabajo 253, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    5. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    6. , R. & , D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
    7. Alexandre Janiak, 2008. "A large firm model of the labor market with entry, exit and search frictions," Documentos de Trabajo 245, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    8. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.

  2. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Working Papers 08-12, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2007. "A Note on Optimal Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000232, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities : Vickrey Versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," Working Papers 2007-26, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    4. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey vs. the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction," 2007 Meeting Papers 427, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Jorge Aseff & Hector Chade, 2008. "An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 731-746, September.
    6. Laurent Lamy, 2007. "Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes," Working Papers 2007-28, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

  3. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms," Working Papers 08-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Figueroa, Nicols & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2009. "A note on optimal allocation mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 169-173, March.

  4. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities," 2005 Meeting Papers 866, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Kumru, Cagri & Yektas, Hadi, 2008. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," MPRA Paper 7575, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe & moldovanu, benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Espinola-Arredondo, Ana, 2008. "Green auctions: A biodiversity study of mechanism design with externalities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 175-183, September.

Articles

  1. Figueroa, Nicolás & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2009. "The role of optimal threats in auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 884-897, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Koessler & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2012. "Optimal Extortion and Political Risk Insurance," Working Papers halshs-00672963, HAL.
    2. Serkan Kucuksenel, 2012. "Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(1), pages 83-93, May.
    3. Koessler, Frédéric & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2014. "Extortion and political-risk insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 144-156.
    4. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2020. "Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 8307, CESifo.
    5. Isabelle Brocas, 2013. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 359-387, September.
    6. Madhav Aney, 2015. "Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 833-859, April.
    7. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2021. "Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(2), pages 283-313, June.
    8. Alexandre Belloni & Changrong Deng & Saša Pekeč, 2017. "Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 577-594, June.
    9. Yamashita, Takuro & Sarkisian, Roberto, 2021. "Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality," TSE Working Papers 21-1241, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Brocas, Isabelle, 2014. "Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 22-33.
    11. Frank Stähler, 2014. "Partial ownership and cross-border mergers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(3), pages 209-237, April.
    12. Chen, Bo & Potipiti, Tanapong, 2010. "Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 825-843, September.
    13. Ying‐Ju Chen, 2021. "Optimal Design of Revenue‐Maximizing Position Auctions with Consumer Search," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(9), pages 3297-3316, September.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2005-12-01 2008-09-13
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2005-12-01

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