The “War on Terror” and Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: Israeli–Turkish Relations and the 1980 Military Coup

What influence does the digital diplomacy of the post 9/11 world have on our understanding of counter-terrorism (CT) diplomacy during the Cold War? This article explores this question and the intersection between intelligence, counterterrorism diplomacy and the digital transformation long overlooked by scholars of Israeli–Turkish relations, Cold War history and terrorism studies. Diplomacy in crisis situations usually operates in an uncertain reality triggered by conflict. Turkey’s domestic crises, specifically its energy crisis between 1978 and 1980, served to shift the country’s foreign policy toward the more anti-Israeli stance of the Arab nations and their demands that Turkey boycott Israel in return for supplying Turkey’s energy needs. This came in the context of a regional wave of contentious politics in the Middle East after the 1979 Iranian revolution, when Israel had just lost three decades of massive investment in Iran under the Shah. I argue that knowing the Turkish military junta’s primary goals centered on the fight against the far left and right political violence at home and on Armenian terror attacks against Turkish diplomats abroad, Israeli diplomats employed a very selective CT policy focusing on the cooperation between Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Public diplomacy was key to conveying this message, and attempts to plant information about the Armenian-Palestinian cooperation in Turkish news outlets and national television were made. Israel’s goal was to influence Turkey’s public emotions and convey to Turkey’s military junta that Jerusalem was a true ally, working to confront the mutual regional threat of Armenian-Palestinian terrorists arising from Lebanese training camps. This case study highlights the paradox that Ministries of Foreign Affairs and diplomats enjoyed an unparalleled monopoly of power during the Cold War over the use of means of public diplomacy, while at the time having very limited capacity, and a frequent need for third party mediators to engage with foreign public audiences. It is thus unlikely that the conveyed messages would have been as visible and disseminated as easily as they could be in the post 9/11 via means of digital diplomacy.