On Theory and Practice of No-Fly Zones in Humanitarian Intervention

Drastic violations of human rights, humanitarian crises or genocide constituted a basis for the intervention of military forces under the flag of the UN or as part of a coalition of states after the end of Cold War. These activities have always been associated with a risk to the intervenors, mainly land units, hence the politicians’ reluctance to make decisions about sending soldiers to a crisis area. Therefore, often the only tool in the hands of politicians remains air power, which enforces a ban on flying over a defined area established by the international community. In the article the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention in the context of international law is the basis for identifying no-fly zones as a political and military tool necessary to resolve crises as part of humanitarian interventions. In addition, it defines what no-fly zones are, the objectives, forms and principles of their creation, as also presents arguments for using air power (air forces) to carry out this type of mission, but also doubts related to their functioning. Theoretical considerations were supported by examples from the use of aviation to enforce no-fly zones in Iraq (1991–2003), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and Libya (2011).