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Content
2019, Volume 113, Issue C
- 533-548 Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks
by Fainmesser, Itay P.
- 549-565 Testing models of belief bias: An experiment
by Coutts, Alexander
- 566-586 Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking
by Polonio, Luca & Coricelli, Giorgio
- 587-610 The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games
by Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Koriyama, Yukio & Sutan, Angela & Willinger, Marc
- 611-632 Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
by Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng
- 633-650 Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
by Sawa, Ryoji
- 651-672 Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge
by Kurschilgen, Michael & Marcin, Isabel
- 673-693 Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
by Nath, Swaprava & Sandholm, Tuomas
- 694-719 Voting with public information
by Liu, Shuo
- 720-733 A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining
by Ortner, Juan
- 734-742 The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games
by Norde, Henk
- 743-755 The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel
- 756-769 Contests between groups of unknown size
by Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry
- 770-780 Belief-updating rule and sequential reciprocity
by Jiang, Lianjie & Wu, Jiabin
2018, Volume 112, Issue C
- 1-20 Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
by Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H.
- 21-48 Strategy-proof location of public facilities
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc
- 49-66 The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners
by Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo
- 67-77 Revealed time preference
by Dziewulski, Paweł
- 78-97 Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination
by Cooper, David J. & Ioannou, Christos A. & Qi, Shi
- 98-124 Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
by Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin
- 125-138 King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Van Essen, Matt
- 139-165 Communication with evidence in the lab
by Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo
- 166-193 Bidding games and efficient allocations
by Meir, Reshef & Kalai, Gil & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 194-218 Non-linear pricing and optimal shipping policies
by Tóbiás, Áron
- 219-230 Financial complexity and trade
by Galanis, Spyros
- 231-241 Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis
by Bonanno, Giacomo & Tsakas, Elias
2018, Volume 111, Issue C
- 1-15 On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël
- 16-19 The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable
by Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad
- 20-40 A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
by Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per
- 41-63 A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data
by Aguiar, Victor H. & Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
- 64-74 No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
by Leucci, Stefano & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Penna, Paolo
- 75-84 Free intermediation in resource transmission
by Han, Lining & Juarez, Ruben
- 85-99 Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs
by Jang, Dooseok & Patel, Amrish & Dufwenberg, Martin
- 100-121 Goal bracketing and self-control
by Hsiaw, Alice
- 122-142 Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation
by Fischer, Mira & Sliwka, Dirk
- 143-158 A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games
by Chen, Chun-Ting & Huang, Chen-Ying & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
- 159-186 (Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem
by Diasakos, Theodoros M. & Koufopoulos, Kostas
- 187-202 Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
by Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma
- 203-216 Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
by Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N.
- 217-221 A simple characterization of responsive choice
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Yenmez, M. Bumin
- 222-240 Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution
by Tarbush, Bassel
- 241-249 On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
by Ellis, Andrew
- 250-273 Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games
by Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor
- 274-288 Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation
by Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian
- 289-304 On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information
by Khan, M. Ali & Zhang, Yongchao
- 305-322 How long is a minute?
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Tarrasó, Jorge
2018, Volume 110, Issue C
- 1-18 On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
by Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus
- 19-31 An axiomatization of plays in repeated games
by Mathevet, Laurent
- 32-49 Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
by Alcalde, José
- 50-57 Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
by Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo
- 58-70 Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies
by Iskakov, M. & Iskakov, A. & d'Aspremont, C.
- 71-89 The object allocation problem with random priorities
by Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz
- 90-119 Preemptive investment under uncertainty
by Steg, Jan-Henrik
- 120-138 Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem
by Perea, Andrés
- 139-164 The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
by Chen, Xi & Diakonikolas, Ilias & Paparas, Dimitris & Sun, Xiaorui & Yannakakis, Mihalis
- 165-173 Information acquisition and the value of bad news
by Ispano, Alessandro
- 174-193 Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
by Mu'alem, Ahuva & Schapira, Michael
- 194-215 Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
by Wenner, Lukas M.
- 216-225 Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
by Rehbeck, John
- 226-247 Price competition in product variety networks
by Ushchev, Philip & Zenou, Yves
- 248-257 Rationalizability and logical inference
by Balkenborg, Dieter
- 258-272 Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions
by Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore
- 273-294 Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip & Newton, Jonathan
- 295-317 Matching in the large: An experimental study
by Chen, Yan & Jiang, Ming & Kesten, Onur & Robin, Stéphane & Zhu, Min
- 318-329 To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions
by Augenblick, Ned & Bodoh-Creed, Aaron
- 330-339 Dynamic communication with biased senders
by Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex
2018, Volume 109, Issue C
- 1-20 Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
by Britz, Volker
- 21-39 Belief updating and the demand for information
by Ambuehl, Sandro & Li, Shengwu
- 40-64 An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner
by Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv
- 65-81 Volunteering under population uncertainty
by Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian
- 82-98 A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives
by Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien
- 99-103 A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly
by Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor V.
- 104-125 Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
by Lubensky, Dmitry & Schmidbauer, Eric
- 126-131 Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams
by de Oliveira, Henrique
- 132-155 Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
by Blume, Andreas
- 156-183 Cognitive ability and games of school choice
by Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco
- 184-200 Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders
by Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone
- 201-211 The lattice of envy-free matchings
by Wu, Qingyun & Roth, Alvin E.
- 212-239 The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment
by Kawagoe, Toshiji & Matsubae, Taisuke & Takizawa, Hirokazu
- 240-261 Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
by Mishra, Debasis & Nath, Swaprava & Roy, Souvik
- 262-270 Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic
by Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny
- 271-293 Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
by Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu
- 294-310 Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination
by Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi
- 311-326 Goal setting in the principal–agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance
by Corgnet, Brice & Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín & Hernán-González, Roberto
- 327-363 Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule
by Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro
- 364-381 Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
by Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro
- 382-400 Bounded memory and incomplete information
by Sperisen, Benjamin
- 401-412 Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent
by Li, Zifan & Tewari, Ambuj
- 413-435 On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia
- 436-451 Perceived motives and reciprocity
by Orhun, A. Yeşim
- 452-464 Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted
by Smith, Vernon L. & Wilson, Bart J.
- 465-483 Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
by Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio
- 501-522 A theory of bargaining deadlock
by Hwang, Ilwoo
- 523-543 Indexing gamble desirability by extending proportional stochastic dominance
by Hellman, Ziv & Schreiber, Amnon
- 544-564 Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W.
- 565-581 Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks
by Kariv, Shachar & Kotowski, Maciej H. & Leister, C. Matthew
- 582-597 Contracting under uncertainty: A principal–agent model with ambiguity averse parties
by Grant, Simon & Jude Kline, J. & Quiggin, John
- 598-615 Speculation under unawareness
by Galanis, Spyros
- 616-624 Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment
by Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Shmaya, Eran
- 625-647 Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes
by Landeo, Claudia M. & Nikitin, Maxim
2018, Volume 108, Issue C
- 22-36 Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions
by Hellman, Ziv & Peretz, Ron
- 37-48 Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
by Casajus, André & Huettner, Frank
- 49-64 Values for environments with externalities – The average approach
by Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 65-80 The Stochastic Shapley Value for coalitional games with externalities
by Skibski, Oskar & Michalak, Tomasz P. & Wooldridge, Michael
- 81-92 Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
by McQuillin, Ben & Sugden, Robert
- 93-112 The proportional Shapley value and applications
by Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe
- 113-124 The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
by Yokote, Koji & Kongo, Takumi & Funaki, Yukihiko
- 125-129 Membership separability: A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
by de Clippel, Geoffroy
- 130-138 Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Mehta, Aranyak & Roughgarden, Tim & Sundararajan, Mukund
- 139-145 Games of threats
by Kohlberg, Elon & Neyman, Abraham
- 146-151 The Shapley value of conjunctive-restricted games
by Derks, Jean
- 152-161 Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
by Kurz, Sascha & Maaser, Nicola & Napel, Stefan
- 162-169 A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
by Hou, Dongshuang & Sun, Hao & Sun, Panfei & Driessen, Theo
- 170-181 Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
by Lindsay, Luke
- 182-205 Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure
by van den Brink, René & He, Simin & Huang, Jia-Ping
- 206-224 Valuing inputs under supply uncertainty: The Bayesian Shapley value
by Pongou, Roland & Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
- 225-238 From the bankruptcy problem and its Concede-and-Divide solution to the assignment problem and its Fair Division solution
by Trudeau, Christian
- 239-244 The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph
by Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo
- 245-268 The stable fixtures problem with payments
by Biró, Péter & Kern, Walter & Paulusma, Daniël & Wojuteczky, Péter
- 269-274 Competitive equilibria in school assignment
by Dur, Umut & Morrill, Thayer
- 275-286 Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
by Jagadeesan, Ravi
- 287-294 Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
by Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross
- 295-316 Limited choice in college admissions: An experimental study
by Chen, Wei-Cheng & Chen, Yi-Yi & Kao, Yi-Cheng
- 317-330 Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match
by Rees-Jones, Alex
- 331-340 A universal construction generating potential games
by Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
- 341-362 Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case
by Cheung, Man-Wah & Lahkar, Ratul
- 363-378 Effectivity and power
by Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans
- 379-390 The conditional Shapley–Shubik measure for ternary voting games
by Friedman, Jane & Parker, Cameron
- 391-400 The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index
by Haimanko, Ori
- 401-410 The query complexity of correlated equilibria
by Hart, Sergiu & Nisan, Noam
- 411-431 Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games
by Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney
- 432-451 Money as minimal complexity
by Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin
- 452-465 Graphical exchange mechanisms
by Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin
- 466-477 Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
by Cao, Zhigang & Qin, Chengzhong & Yang, Xiaoguang
- 478-485 Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Julien, Ludovic & Tonin, Simone
- 486-503 Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators: Applications to zero-sum stochastic games
by Ziliotto, Bruno
- 504-522 Zero-sum revision games
by Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan
- 523-540 Acceptable strategy profiles in stochastic games
by Solan, Eilon
- 541-557 On a class of vertices of the core
by Grabisch, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter
- 558-573 Competitive pricing and the core: With reference to matching
by Ostroy, Joseph M.
- 574-584 Fair stable sets of simple games
by Talamàs, Eduard
- 585-591 Coalition preferences with individual prospects
by Baucells, Manel & Samet, Dov
- 592-599 Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley
by Zhao, Jingang
- 600-613 Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information
by Matros, Alexander
2018, Volume 107, Issue C
- 1-20 Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
by Han, Xiang
- 21-40 Reward schemes
by Lagziel, David & Lehrer, Ehud
- 41-59 Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
by Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
- 60-92 Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments
by Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph
- 93-108 Collusion through communication in auctions
by Agranov, Marina & Yariv, Leeat
- 109-122 Stable biased sampling
by Häfner, Samuel
- 123-134 Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence
by Fehr, Dietmar
- 135-152 Constitutions and groups
by Mauleon, Ana & Roehl, Nils & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
- 153-181 How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
by Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik
- 182-202 Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task
by Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs
- 203-219 Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations
by Zhang, Huanren
- 220-237 Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
by Fainmesser, Itay P. & Goldberg, David A.
- 238-252 Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: An experiment
by Daskalova, Vessela
- 253-281 Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
by Fonseca, Miguel A. & Peters, Kim
- 282-297 Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory
by Gee, Laura K. & Schreck, Michael J.
- 298-315 Buridanic competition
by Bachi, Benjamin & Spiegler, Ran
- 316-328 Inequality and risk-taking behaviour
by Hopkins, Ed
- 329-344 Temptation and commitment in the laboratory
by Houser, Daniel & Schunk, Daniel & Winter, Joachim & Xiao, Erte
- 345-363 On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
by Bhattacharya, Sourav & Goltsman, Maria & Mukherjee, Arijit
- 364-379 Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game
by Xiao, Jun
- 380-395 Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning
by Eliaz, Kfir & Frug, Alexander
2017, Volume 106, Issue C
- 1-15 An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
by Muto, Nozomu & Sato, Shin
- 16-37 Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
by Wright, James R. & Leyton-Brown, Kevin
- 38-50 Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
by Arzumanyan, Mariam & Polborn, Mattias K.
- 51-74 Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
by Gauer, F. & Hellmann, T.
- 75-88 Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games
by Seel, Christian & Tsakas, Elias
- 89-113 Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market
by Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav
- 114-133 Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning
by Marden, Jason R.
- 134-152 Introspective unawareness and observable choice
by Piermont, Evan
- 153-160 Information control in reputational cheap talk
by Anbarci, Nejat & Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep
- 161-178 Promises and expectations
by Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander
- 179-187 The procedural egalitarian solution
by Dietzenbacher, Bas & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud
- 188-208 Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence
by Cooper, Kristen B. & Schneider, Henry S. & Waldman, Michael
- 209-226 Applying “theory of mind”: Theory and experiments
by Kimbrough, Erik O. & Robalino, Nikolaus & Robson, Arthur J.
- 227-238 Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
by Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin
- 239-259 Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants
by Casella, Alessandra & Laslier, Jean-François & Macé, Antonin
- 260-276 Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
by Wu, Jiabin
- 277-293 Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price
by Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Woods, Daniel
- 294-316 Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey
by Paes Leme, Renato
- 317-328 Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result
by Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland
- 329-342 The cost of segregation in (social) networks
by Allouch, Nizar
2017, Volume 105, Issue C
- 1-8 Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
by Huang, Chao & Tian, Guoqiang
- 9-39 Balanced ranking mechanisms
by Long, Yan & Mishra, Debasis & Sharma, Tridib
- 40-58 Peer effects and local congestion in networks
by Currarini, Sergio & Fumagalli, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio
- 59-83 Modularity and greed in double auctions
by Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim
- 84-103 Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities
by Demange, Gabrielle
- 104-111 Auctions with selective entry
by Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng
- 112-121 Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 122-147 The Inverse Shapley value problem
by De, Anindya & Diakonikolas, Ilias & Servedio, Rocco A.
- 148-154 On the externality-free Shapley–Shubik index
by Álvarez-Mozos, M. & Alonso-Meijide, J.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G.
- 155-176 Paternalism, homophily and cultural transmission in random networks
by Panebianco, Fabrizio & Verdier, Thierry
- 177-194 Social motives vs social influence: An experiment on interdependent time preferences
by Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael & Ponti, Giovanni
- 195-211 Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
by Ewerhart, Christian
- 212-229 Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence
by Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry