Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empirical findings on direct democracy are presented. In the first part, we show that, on average, public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats are more constrained in direct democracies and have to be compensated by higher wages for that loss of power. In the second part, we demonstrate that reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in jurisdictions with stronger direct democratic rights. This is not only the case because people value political outcomes higher but they derive utility from the political process itself.
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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW in its series IEW - Working Papers with number
iewwp025.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Di Tella, R. & MacCulloch, R.J.: Oswald, A.J., 1997.
"The Macroeconomics of Happiness,"
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Clark, Andrew E & Oswald, Andrew J, 1994.
"Unhappiness and Unemployment,"
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Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 648-59, May.
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