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Allokationseffekte der Besteuerung im Rahmen des Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes und des Einheitsprinzips

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  • Schröer, André

Abstract

Die Abgrenzung des Erfolges multinationaler Unternehmungen (MNU) für körper-schaftsteuerliche Zwecke erfolgt im Regelfall im Rahmen des Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes, konkretisiert durch die Transferpreisrichtlinien der OECD. Dieses Erfolgsabgrenzungsparadigma steht im systematischen Gegensatz zu den ökonomischen Theorien der MNU und widerspricht der Auffassung von der MNU als integrierter Unternehmung. Es wird gezeigt, dass unter Berücksichtigung der Besteuerung als einzigem nicht natürlichem Standortfaktor steuerliche Transferpreisregelungen nur in wenigen Fällen Entscheidungsneutralität der Erfolgsabgrenzung sichern können; dieses gilt auch, wenn die Implikationen der Theorie der MNU ignoriert werden. Daher ist es aus ökonomischer Perspektive abzulehnen, unterschiedliche administrierte Verrechnungspreise zur Fingierung eines Fremdvergleiches zu setzen. Da sich die EU-Kommission in jüngerer Zeit verstärkt für die Einführung einer Einheitsbesteuerung für MNU im Binnenmarkt ausspricht, wird weiterhin gezeigt, unter welchen Umständen es zu einer effizienten Allokation im Rahmen einer nach US-amerikanischem Vorbild ausgestalteten Konzernbesteuerung kommen kann.

Suggested Citation

  • Schröer, André, 2002. "Allokationseffekte der Besteuerung im Rahmen des Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes und des Einheitsprinzips," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-53, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:569
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. L. W. Copithorne, 1971. "International Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 4(3), pages 324-341, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multinationale Unternehmung; Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz; Einheitsprinzip; Entscheidungsneutralität;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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