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A political economy of China's export restrictions on rare earth elements

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  • Pothen, Frank
  • Fink, Kilian

Abstract

We investigate why governments restrict exports of exotic raw materials taking rare earth elements as a case study. Trade restrictions on exotic materials do not have immediate macroeconomic effects. Relocating rare earth intensive industries is found to be the main reason behind China's export barriers. They are part of a more extensive strategy aiming at creating comparative advantages in these sectors and at overcoming path dependencies. Moreover, export barriers serve as a second-best instrument to reduce pollution and to slow down the depletion of exhaustible resources. Growing domestic rare earth consumption renders those increasingly ineffective. Rising reliance on mine-site regulation indicates that this fact is taken into account. Rare earth extraction is dominated by a few large companies; the demand side is dispersed. That speaks against successful lobbying for export restrictions. It appears as if the export barriers are set up to compensate mining firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Pothen, Frank & Fink, Kilian, 2015. "A political economy of China's export restrictions on rare earth elements," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:15025
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    Cited by:

    1. Pothen, Frank, 2013. "The metal resources (METRO) model: A dynamic partial equilibrium model for metal markets applied to rare earth elements," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-112, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Eisenbarth, Sabrina, 2017. "Is Chinese trade policy motivated by environmental concerns?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 74-103.
    3. Pothen, Frank, 2014. "Dynamic market power in an exhaustible resource industry: The case of rare earth elements," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-005, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rare Earths; Export Restrictions; Political Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q37 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Issues in International Trade
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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