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Network effects, compatibility decisions, and monopolization

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  • Woeckener, Bernd

Abstract

This paper analyzes the compatibility decision of a dominant hardware supplier. There are two substitutive variants of the hardware component of a hardware-software system, they are horizontally differentiated, and one of the two has a quality advantage. Among other things, we show under what circumstances the dominant supplier monopolizes his market via maintaining incompatibility with the variant of the competitor. It turns out that, depending on the significance of the network effects, of the horizontal differentiation and of the quality advantage, not only the coexistence of compatible variants but also a monopolization and even the coexistence of incompatible variants can be welfare superior.

Suggested Citation

  • Woeckener, Bernd, 1998. "Network effects, compatibility decisions, and monopolization," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 125, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:125
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/104937/1/tdb125.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 70-83, Spring.
    2. Desruelle, Dominique & Gaudet, Gerard & Richelle, Yves, 1996. "Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 747-768, October.
    3. Chou, Chien-fu & Shy, Oz, 1990. "Network effects without network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 259-270, June.
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1992. "Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 9-35, March.
    5. Church, Jeffrey & Gandal, Neil, 1992. "Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 85-103, March.
    6. Harald Wiese, 1997. "Compatibility, Business Strategy and Market Structure - a Selective Survey," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 14, pages 283-308.
    7. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 424-440, June.
    8. de Palma, Andre & Leruth, Luc, 1996. "Variable willingness to pay for network externalities with strategic standardization decisions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 235-251, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compatibility; Monopolization; Network effects; Standardization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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