IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/safewh/85.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Reset required: The euro area crisis management and deposit insurance framework

Author

Listed:
  • Huertas, Thomas F.

Abstract

The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework in the euro area requires a reset. Although its policy objectives remain valid, the means of achieving them do not. As the euro area comes the end of the long transition period taken to implement the BRRD/SRMR, it should take the opportunity to reset expectations about resolution. Above all, resolution should be for the many, not just the few. There should be a single presumptive path for dealing with failed banks: the use of bail-in to facilitate orderly liquidation under a solvent-wind down strategy. This will protect deposits and set the stage - together with the backstop that the European Stability Mechanism provides to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) -- for the transformation of the SRF into the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme (SDGS). To avoid forbearance, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) should rest, not with national central banks, but with the ECB as a single lender of last resort. Finally, national deposit guarantee schemes should function as institutional protection schemes and become investors of last resort in their member banks. Together, these measures would complete Banking Union, promote market discipline, avoid imposing additional burdens on taxpayers, help untie the doom loop between weak banks and weak governments, strengthen the euro and enhance financial stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Huertas, Thomas F., 2021. "Reset required: The euro area crisis management and deposit insurance framework," SAFE White Paper Series 85, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:85
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/233858/1/1757099697.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tobias H. Tröger, 2020. "Why MREL won’t help much: minimum requirements for bail-in capital as an insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank resolution framework," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(1), pages 64-81, March.
    2. Bonfim, Diana & Santos, João A.C., 2023. "The importance of deposit insurance credibility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    3. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1781-1823.
    4. Edward J. Kane, 2020. "Masters of Illusion: Bank and Regulatory Accounting for Losses in Distressed Banks," Working Papers Series inetwp136, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    5. Angeloni, Ignazio (ed.), 2020. "Beyond the Pandemic: Reviving Europe’s Banking Union," Vox eBooks, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number p327.
    6. Martin F. Hellwig, 2018. "Valuation reports in the context of banking resolution: What are the challenges?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2018_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    7. Thomas F. Huertas, 2014. "Safe to Fail," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-38365-5, September.
    8. Huertas, Thomas F., 2020. "Plug the gap: Make resolution ready for corona," SAFE White Paper Series 73, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    9. Thomas F. Huertas, 2011. "Crisis: Cause, Containment and Cure," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, edition 2, number 978-0-230-32135-9, September.
    10. Huertas, Thomas, 2016. "How to deal with the Resolution of Financial Market Infrastructures," CEPS Papers 11907, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    11. Franke, Günter & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & von Lüpke, Thomas, 2014. "Effective resolution of banks: Problems and solutions," SAFE White Paper Series 19, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    12. Thomas F. Huertas, 2014. "Safe to Fail," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Safe to Fail, chapter 4, pages 82-133, Palgrave Macmillan.
    13. Huertas, Thomas F., 2019. "Completing banking union," SAFE White Paper Series 63, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Huertas, Thomas F., 2020. "Plug the gap: Make resolution ready for corona," SAFE White Paper Series 73, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    2. Faia, Ester & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, 2015. "Cross-border resolution of global banks," SAFE Working Paper Series 88, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Thomas F. Huertas, 2014. "Resolution Reform," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 13(4), pages 86-99.
    4. Toma Sorin-George & Gradinaru Catalin, 2018. "Too Big To Fail Banks In The Age Of Globalization," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 0, pages 131-136, December.
    5. Haselmann, Rainer & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2019. "Evaluierung gesamt- und finanzwirtschaftlicher Effekte der Reformen europäischer Finanzmarktregulierung im deutschen Finanzsektor seit der Finanzkrise: Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse," SAFE Policy Reports 2, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    6. Weder di Mauro, Beatrice & Faia, Ester, 2016. "Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks: Bail in under Single Point of Entry versus Multiple Points of Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 11171, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Fernando Broner & Daragh Clancy & Aitor Erce & Alberto Martin, 2022. "Fiscal Multipliers and Foreign Holdings of Public Debt [When Should You Adjust Standard Errors for Clustering?]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(3), pages 1155-1204.
    8. Christian Bittner & Diana Bonfim & Florian Heider & Farzad Saidi & Glenn Schepens & Carla Soares, 2022. "The Augmented Bank Balance-Sheet Channel of Monetary Policy," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 149, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    9. Acharya, Viral & Pierret, Diane & Steffen, Sascha, 2016. "Lender of last resort versus buyer of last resort: The impact of the European Central Bank actions on the bank-sovereign nexus," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-019, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    10. Carlos Madeira, 2022. "The double impact of deep social unrest and a pandemic: Evidence from Chile," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(S1), pages 135-171, February.
    11. Paul Pelzl & María Teresa Valderrama, 2019. "Capital regulations and the management of credit commitments during crisis times," DNB Working Papers 661, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    12. Leandro Andrián & Oscar Mauricio Valencia, 2023. "Past the Tipping Point? Assessing Debt Overhang in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Book Chapters), in: Andrew Powell & Oscar Mauricio Valencia (ed.), Dealing with Debt, edition 1, chapter 8, pages 183-196, Inter-American Development Bank.
    13. Jean Tirole, 2021. "Emmanuel Farhi, Economist Par Excellence," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 1-17, August.
    14. Bletzinger, Tilman & von Thadden, Leopold, 2021. "Designing QE in a fiscally sound monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    15. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Luis Garicano & Philip R. Lane & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Tano Santos & David Thesmar & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2016. "The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 508-512, May.
    16. Coimbra, Nuno, 2020. "Sovereigns at risk: A dynamic model of sovereign debt and banking leverage," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    17. Catalán, Mario & Hoffmaister, Alexander W., 2022. "When banks punch back: Macrofinancial feedback loops in stress tests," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    18. Vedolin, Andrea & Leombroni, Matteo & , & Whelan, Paul, 2018. "Central Bank Communication and the Yield Curve," CEPR Discussion Papers 12970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Agarwala, Matthew & Burke, Matt & Klusak, Patrycja & Mohaddes, Kamiar & Volz, Ulrich & Zenghelis, Dimitri, 2021. "Climate Change And Fiscal Sustainability: Risks And Opportunities," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 258, pages 28-46, November.
    20. Giulio Velliscig & Maurizio Polato & Josanco Floreani & Enrica Bolognesi, 2024. "The bail-in credibility: barking dogs seldom bite," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deposit Insurance; Crisis Management; BRRD; Resolution;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csafede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.