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The next SSM term: Supervisory challenges ahead

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  • Götz, Martin
  • Tröger, Tobias
  • Wahrenburg, Mark

Abstract

In this note, we first highlight different developments for banks under direct ECB supervision within the SSM that may prompt further investigation by supervisors. We find that banks that were weakly capitalized at the start of direct ECB supervision (1) still face elevated levels of non-performing loans, (2) are less cost-efficient and (3) reduced their share of subordinated debt financing over the last years. We then stress the importance of continuous and ongoing cost-benefit analysis regarding banking supervision in Europe. We also encourage processes to question existing supervisory practices to ensure a lean and efficient banking supervision. Finally, we underline the need of continuous and intensified coordination among regulatory bodies in the Banking Union since the efficacy of European bank supervision rests on its interplay with many different institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Götz, Martin & Tröger, Tobias & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2019. "The next SSM term: Supervisory challenges ahead," SAFE White Paper Series 59, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:59
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bolton, Patrick & Oehmke, Martin, 2018. "Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 13032, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Götz, Martin & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Tröger, Tobias, 2017. "Five years after the Liikanen Report: What have we learned?," SAFE White Paper Series 50, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2012. "Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262017393, December.
    4. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2021. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 455-470, January.
    5. Ms. Enrica Detragiache & Mr. Thierry Tressel & Ms. Rima A Turk, 2018. "Where Have All the Profits Gone? European Bank Profitability Over the Financial Cycle," IMF Working Papers 2018/099, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2018. "Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks," NBER Working Papers 24737, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferretti, Riccardo & Venturelli, Valeria & Azzaretto, Alessandro, 2023. "Does individual SREP results reveal real news?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    2. Michał Kruszka & Marcin Wroński, 2020. "Divulgence of Additional Capital Requirements in the EU Banking Union," Economies, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-10, May.

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    Keywords

    SSM; Banking Union; ECB supervision;
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