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Political redistribution: The role of delegated lobbying and wage bargaining

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  • Grüner, Hans Peter

Abstract

Traditional political economy models of taxation fail to explain why there is so little redistribution of wealth despite significant wealth inequalites. This is for two reasons: (1) The median voter approach cannot deal with a multidimensional policy-space and (2) wealth taxation affects well-organized and homogenous interest groups so that lobbying affects policy outcomes. In this paper the interaction of factor price bargaining and delegated tax-lobbying is studied. Two agents engage in lobbying: managers of large firms and trade union leaders. Low wealth taxation is the natural consequence of income maxmimization on the side of interest group leaders if (1) managers are in a position to appropriate part of the firms' revenues for themselves and (2) union members cannot monitor the lobbying activities of union leaders.

Suggested Citation

  • Grüner, Hans Peter, 1995. "Political redistribution: The role of delegated lobbying and wage bargaining," Discussion Papers, Series II 272, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:272
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lobbying; taxation of wealth; wage bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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