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Nichts ist unmöglich - Corona! Wirtschaftspsychologische Erklärungen zu den Anfängen der Corona-Krise

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  • Pitters, Julia

Abstract

A novel Covid-19 virus initially threatens the Chinese metropolis of Wu-Han and has been causing a global pandemic in 2020. In order to impede the spread of the virus and thus relieve the burden on the respective health care systems, governments around the world are being forced to impose unprecedented restrictions on social life. In addition to closing all forms of public life and cancelling all public events, the measures taken in Austria also include an initial restriction for the individual to stay at home. From an economic-psychological point of view, the decision to comply with these measures can be described as a social dilemma. The individual would profit from defection but at the expense of the general public. The Federal Government must therefore provide appropriate incentives to convince citizens to still comply either through trust or sanctions. Using the example of Austria, this article examines how the emergence of the crisis is first perceived, which communication strategies are used to motivate citizens to comply and why citizens sometimes react with supposedly irrational actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Pitters, Julia, 2020. "Nichts ist unmöglich - Corona! Wirtschaftspsychologische Erklärungen zu den Anfängen der Corona-Krise," IU Discussion Papers - Social Sciences 3/2020, IU International University of Applied Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iubhso:32020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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    Keywords

    Corona-crisis; social dilemma; justice perception; reactance; in-group bias; loss aversion;
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