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On the antitrust economics of the electronic books industry

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Listed:
  • Gaudin, Germain
  • White, Alexander

Abstract

When Apple entered the ebook market, prices rose. A recent court decision found Apple guilty of colluding with publishers, blaming the price hike, in part, on agency agreements and prohibiting their use. Building a model to compare these with traditional wholesale agreements, we identify a single, pivotal condition that leads prices under agency to be higher than under wholesale with two-part tariffs but lower with linear pricing. Our model shows that the increase in ebook prices can be explained, instead, by heightened competition for reading devices, and it guides our understanding of when restricting agency agreements is advisable.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaudin, Germain & White, Alexander, 2014. "On the antitrust economics of the electronic books industry," DICE Discussion Papers 147 [rev.], Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:147r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electronic Books; Antitrust in High-Tech Industries; Vertical Contracting; Wholesale vs. Agency Agreements; Media Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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