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Corporate Governance in Deutschland – Perspektiven der Wissenschaft. Ein Konferenzbericht

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  • Deutsch, Klaus Günter

Abstract

Das deutsche System der Finanzierung, Leitung und Kontrolle von Unternehmen, kurz der Corporate Governance, unterliegt einem weit reichenden Veränderungsprozess. Die wichtigsten Ursachen liegen in der Internationalisierung des Anlagekapitals, der regulatorischen Reform sowie einer erhöhten Transparenz unternehmerischer Leistung. Die Regulierung der Unternehmenskontrolle geht mittlerweile über die engeren aktienrechtlichen Bestimmungen weit hinaus. Der Deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex setzt neue private Mindeststandards. Ein Transparenzund Publizitätsgesetz wird folgen. Auch institutionelle Investoren üben Druck mit eigenen Forderungskatalogen aus. International orientierte Unternehmen werden eigene Regelwerke ausarbeiten. Das deutsche System der Kontrolle durch Großaktionäre und Gläubiger richtet sich stärker am Kapitalmarkt aus. Die Übergangsphase birgt ein erhebliches Krisenpotenzial. Nur rasches Handeln des Gesetzgebers wie der Unternehmen selbst kann ein Abgleiten des Systems verhindern. Die volle Transparenz der Eigentums- und Kontrollstrukturen, umfangreiche, zeitnahe Offenlegungspflichten, starke Rechte von Minderheitsaktionären und eine Reform der Unternehmensorgane Hauptversammlung, Aufsichtsrat und Vorstand stehen auf der Agenda. Transparenz, starke Aktionärsrechte und funktionstüchtige Institutionen gehen mit niedrigen Kapitalkosten einher, und umgekehrt! Direkte Kontrolle durch Großaktionäre sowie kontroverse Eigentümerwechsel im Zuge von Aktienpakettransaktionen werden noch auf absehbare Zeit eine größere Rolle spielen als die Disziplinierung des Managements durch Unternehmensübernahmen in Form öffentlicher Kaufangebote an die Aktionäre. Dies stellt kein Manko dar. Während sich konzentrierter Anteilsbesitz im Schnitt positiv auf die wirtschaftliche Leistung von Unternehmen auswirkt, konnte dies für den Markt für Unternehmensübernahmen bisher nicht nachgewiesen werden. Zukünftig sollte einem wachsenden Einfluss von institutionellen Inves-toren ein sinkender Einfluss von Gläubigern in der Kontrolle gegenüberstehen. Die damit verbundene Reduzierung von Zielkonflikten ist zu begrüßen.

Suggested Citation

  • Deutsch, Klaus Günter, 2002. "Corporate Governance in Deutschland – Perspektiven der Wissenschaft. Ein Konferenzbericht," Research Notes 02-3, Deutsche Bank Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:dbrrns:023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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