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Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Überwachungskosten

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  • Neunzig, Alexander R.

Abstract

Für die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie ist es ein weitgehend ungelöstes Rätsel, warum reale Arbeitsverträge sehr geringe monetäre Leistungsanreize spezifizieren. In dieser Arbeit wird auf der Grundlage des Prinzipal-Agenten-Ansatzes ein Modell entwickelt, dass sowohl Fixlohnverträge als auch Anreizverträge erklären kann, die eine geringe Leistungsabhängigkeit beinhalten. Hierzu wird einerseits angenommen, dass Arbeitnehmer nicht nur Arbeitsleid, sondern auch Arbeitsfreude empfinden. Andererseits wird angenommen, dass die Überwachung der Leistung von Arbeitnehmern nicht kostenlos erfolgen kann.

Suggested Citation

  • Neunzig, Alexander R., 2002. "Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Überwachungskosten," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200202
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal-agent-theory; personnel economics; contract theory; industrial economics; intrinsic motivation; agency costs; monitoring expenditures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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