IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bonedp/92007.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Experimental Investigation of a Cyclic Duopoly Game

Author

Listed:
  • Goerg, Sebastian J.
  • Selten, Reinhard

Abstract

The notion of a cyclic game has been introduced by Selten and Wooders (2001). They illustrate the concept by the analysis of a cyclic duopoly game. The experiments reported concern this game. The game was played by eleven matching groups of six players each. The observed choice fre- quencies were compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium, impulse balance equilibrium (Selten, Abbink and Cox (2005), Selten and Chmura (2007)) and two-sample equilbrium (Osborne and Rubinstein(1998)). Pair- wise comparisons by the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test show that impulse balance equilibrium as well as two-sample equilibrium have a significantly better predictive success than Nash equilibrium. The difference between impulse balance equilibrium and two-sample equilibrium is not significant.In each matching group three players acted only in uneven periods and the other three only in even periods. This game has two pure strategy equi- libria in which both types of players behave differently. The data exhibit a weak but significant tendency in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Goerg, Sebastian J. & Selten, Reinhard, 2007. "Experimental Investigation of a Cyclic Duopoly Game," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 9/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:92007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/22984/1/bgse9_2007.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Judith Avrahami & Werner Güth & Yaakov Kareev, 2005. "Games of Competition in a Stochastic Environment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(4), pages 255-294, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2014. "Impulse balance in the newsvendor game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 237-247.
    2. Ori Plonsky & Yefim Roth & Ido Erev, 2021. "Underweighting of rare events in social interactions and its implications to the design of voluntary health applications," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(2), pages 267-289, March.
    3. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:2:p:267-289 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Einav Hart & Yaakov Kareev & Judith Avrahami, 2012. "Reversal of Risky Choice in a Good versus a Bad World," Discussion Paper Series dp619, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Sebastian Goerg & Reinhard Selten, 2009. "Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 253-271, September.
    6. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael, 2012. "Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 184-207.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cyclic game duopoly experiment; impulse balance equilibrium; two-sample equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:92007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/gsbonde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.