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On Local and Network Games

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Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Yale University, School of Management)
Thomas Quint () (University of Nevada, Reno)

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Abstract

The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what constitutes a satisfactory solution concept.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm361.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm361

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Related research
Keywords: Local Games; Network Games; Advertising;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
M39 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Other
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Shubik, Martin, 1996. "Why equilibrium? A note on the noncooperative equilibria of some matrix games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 537-539, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
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  3. Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78, January.
    Other versions:
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