William N. Goetzmann () (Yale School of Management, International Center for Finance) Matthew I. Spiegel () (Yale School of Management, International Center for Finance) Andrey Ukhov () (Yale School of Management)
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This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. Conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the data, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F3 - International Economics - - International Finance G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
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