Speculation in asset market is modelled as a stochastic betting game played by finite number of players and repeated infinite times. With stochastic asset return and unkown quality of public signal, a generic adaptive learning rule is proposed and the corresponding evolutionary dynamics is analyzed. The impact of historical events on players' belief decays over time. It is proved to be a robust approach to adapt to stochastic regime shifts in the market. The market dynamics has characteristics, i.e. endogenous boom-bust cycle, positive correlation in return and volume, and negative first order autocorrelation in return series, commonly observed in financial market but inexplicable by conventional rational expectations theory.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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