Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers

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Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers

Author Info

Paolo Laureti
Frantisek Slanina
Yi-Kuo Yu
Yi-Cheng Zhang

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Paolo Laureti

Abstract

We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial website gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly sellers they bargained with, vendors are forced to be more honest. This leads to mutual beneficial symbiosis between buyers and sellers; the overall enhanced volume of transactions contributes ultimately to the website, which facilitates the matchmaking service.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0307001.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0307001

Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 19; figures: included. Published on Physica A 316 (2002) 413
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C39 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Other
C49 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Other
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-NET-2003-08-17 (Network Economics)

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