Designing contracts for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
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Cited by:
- Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2015. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts under the threat of early exit: the case of conservation auctions," Working Paper Series 2015:6, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases; Environmental Economics&Policies; Debt Markets; Forestry; Climate Change and Environment;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-AGR-2013-07-05 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-07-05 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-RES-2013-07-05 (Resource Economics)
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