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The private value single item bisection auction

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  • Grigorieva, E.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Herings, P.J.J.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Vermeulen, A.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Müller, R.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Vermeulen, A.J. & Müller, R.J., 2002. "The private value single item bisection auction," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2002035
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2002035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    2. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Kahn, Charles M., 1991. "Protecting the winner : Second-price versus oral auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 243-248, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Müller, R.J. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2006. "Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Grigorieva, E. & Strobel, M., 2006. "Bidding behavior in the bisection auction : an experimental investigation," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Grigorieva, E. & Herings, P.J.J. & Müller, R.J. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2007. "On the fastest vickrey algorithm," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2008. "Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-13, January.
    5. Jim Ingebretsen Carlson, 2020. "A speedy auction using approximated bidders’ preferences," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 65-93, May.
    6. Albin Erlanson, 2014. "The Duo-Item Bisection Auction," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(1), pages 15-31, January.
    7. Sushil Bikhchandani & Sven de Vries & James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2011. "An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 400-413, April.
    8. Flesch, J. & Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2009. "Strategic disclosure of random variables," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    9. Grigorieva, Elena & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2012. "Fraction auctions: The tradeoff between efficiency and running time," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(2), pages 577-587.
    10. Ryuji Sano, 2016. "Iterative Revelation Mechanisms," KIER Working Papers 937, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    11. Bergemann, Dirk & Wambach, Achim, 2015. "Sequential information disclosure in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1074-1095.
    12. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Ryuji Sano, 2021. "Dynamic communication mechanism design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 163-180, July.
    14. Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim, 2016. "An Auction with Approximated Bidder Preferences - When an Auction has to be Quick," Working Papers 2016:12, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    15. Andersson, Tommy & Erlanson, Albin, 2013. "Multi-item Vickrey–English–Dutch auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 116-129.
    16. Fadel, Ronald & Segal, Ilya, 2009. "The communication cost of selfishness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1895-1920, September.
    17. Kos, Nenad, 2014. "Asking questions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 642-650.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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