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Non-Cooperative Behavior in a Public Goods Experiment with Interior Solution

Author

Listed:
  • Marc WILLINGER
  • Anthony ZIEGELMEYER

Abstract

We designed an experiment on voluntary contribution to a public good with interior solution. The treatment variable is the equilibrium level of contribution. We observe that the verage overcontribution rate (cooperation) is affected by the equilibrium level of contribution. Overcontribution is statistically significant only at the lower level of equilibrium contribution but not at the higher levels. We discuss several possible explanations, and suggest that behavioral heterogeneity might account for the observed pattern of overcontribution. Simulation results based on a simple model of heterogeneous interacting agents confirm our intuition.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc WILLINGER & Anthony ZIEGELMEYER, 1999. "Non-Cooperative Behavior in a Public Goods Experiment with Interior Solution," Working Papers of BETA 9922, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:9922
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    File URL: http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/1999/9922.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Willinger & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2001. "Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 131-144, October.
    2. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Li, Yaxiong & Paichayontvijit, Tirnud, 2016. "What’s in a frame? Goal framing, trust and reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 117-135.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    experimental economics; public goods; learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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