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On Incentives in Three-Sided Markets

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  • Jorge Arenas
  • Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Abstract

In a class of three-sided matching problems that always have stable solutions, we show that no stable mechanism is strategy-proof for those who internalize the trilateral structure in their preferences. Furthermore, strong restrictions on preferences are needed to ensure that stability and one-sided strategy-proofness are compatible for all sides of the market. These results are related to the incompatibility between stability and one-sided group strategy-proofness in two-sided markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Arenas & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2024. "On Incentives in Three-Sided Markets," Working Papers wp558, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp558
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
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