This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2004-05-26 (All new papers)
• NEP-EEC-2004-05-26 (European Economics)
• NEP-LAW-2004-05-26 (Law & Economics)

1. Daniel F. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1993. "Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 343-356, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Gravelle, Hugh & Waterson, Michael, 1993. "No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1205-20, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, . "Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1038, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1072, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004. ""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-, December.
4. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 575-612, June.
5. Dana, James D, Jr & Spier, Kathryn E, 1993. "Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 349-67, October.
6. Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Contingent fees and litigation settlement1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 295-317, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
9. Emons, Winand, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
   • Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Hay, Bruce L, 1997. "Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 259-78, January.
11. Patricia Munch Danzon, 1983. "Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 213-224, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1991. "Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 381-99, June.
13. Santore, Rudy & Viard, Alan D, 2001. "Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rights," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 549-72, October.
14. Lynk, William J, 1990. "The Courts and the Market: An Economic Analysis of Contingent Fees in Class-Action Litigation," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 247-60, January.
15. Alon Klement, 2004. "Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 102-124, April.
16. Rickman, Neil, 1994. "The Economics of Contingency Fees in Personal Injury Litigation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 34-50, Spring.
17. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2002. "A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 217-225, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1020, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
18. Hay, Bruce L, 1996. "Contingent Fees and Agency Costs," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 503-33, June.
19. Halpern, P. J. & Turnbull, S. M., 1983. "Legal fees contracts and alternative cost rules: An economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Miceli, Thomas J, 1994. "Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 211-24, January.

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1. Emons, Winand, 2005. "Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Winand Emons, 2004. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0419, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
   • Winand Emons, 2006. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 20-32. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits," MPRA Paper 4846, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
3. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," MPRA Paper 8995, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Emons, Winand, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)