Wei Ding () (Bonn Graduate School of Economics) Elmar Wolfstetter () (Humboldt-University at Berlin) Thomas D. Jeitschko () (Humboldt-University at Berlin)
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In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first- price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
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Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number
261.