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Tradition and Common Property Management

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  • Matthew A. Turner

Abstract

Since management of a common property resource can only be undertaken by a government of finitely lived agents, a natural way to study common property management is to study the behavior of such governments. This paper proposes that the choice of management objective by a government of finitely lived agents be regarded as a ``move'' in a game of sequential agents. Given this framework, it is shown that there exist subgame perfect equilibria in which each successive government chooses the same ``traditional'' management objective. These strategies enable an economy to overcome an intergenerational externality which can occur otherwise. Thus, following a tradition of conservation may be a rational response to an intergenerational externality. While the paper is primarily concerned with common property economies, the results also apply to private property economies and are relevant to the current debate over ``sustainability''

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Tradition and Common Property Management," Working Papers mturner-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:mturner-95-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacques Cremer, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49.
    2. Matthew A. Turner, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Common Property Regulation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 809-821, November.
    3. Olson, Lars J. & Knapp, Keith C., 1997. "Exhaustible Resource Allocation in an Overlapping Generations Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 277-292, March.
    4. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September.
    5. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92.
    6. Solow, Robert, 1993. "An almost practical step toward sustainability," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 162-172, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nomfundo Mabuza, Nosipho, 2016. "Socio-economic impact of land reform projects benefiting from the Recapitalisation and Development Programme in South Africa," Research Theses 243471, Collaborative Masters Program in Agricultural and Applied Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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    1. Socio-economics of Fisheries and Aquaculture

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