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Regularory co-opetition : Transcending the regulatory competition debate

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  • Geradin, D.A.A.G.

    (Tilburg University, TILEC)

  • McCahery, J.A.

    (Tilburg University, TILEC)

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  • Geradin, D.A.A.G. & McCahery, J.A., 2005. "Regularory co-opetition : Transcending the regulatory competition debate," Discussion Paper 2005, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutil:e3fe5f9b-dba3-4759-b757-44cb7611e877
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Murphy, Dale D., 2004. "The Structure of Regulatory Competition: Corporations and Public Policies in a Global Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199267514.
    2. Van Den Bergh, Roger, 1996. "Economic criteria for applying the subsidiarity principle in the European community: The case of competition policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 363-383, September.
    3. Roberta Romano, 2001. "The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm214, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2001.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1988. "Fundamentals of Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121271, December.
    5. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
    7. Roberta Romano, "undated". "The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1015, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October.
    9. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
    10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Incentives and Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248681.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joanna Cygler & Włodzimierz Sroka & Marina Solesvik & Katarzyna Dębkowska, 2018. "Benefits and Drawbacks of Coopetition: The Roles of Scope and Durability in Coopetitive Relationships," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-24, August.

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