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Sequential Common Agency

Author

Listed:
  • Prat, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Rustichini, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Prat, A. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Sequential Common Agency," Discussion Paper 1998-95, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:43e3a59a-aee6-4172-96b4-195e69b1c080
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/529904/95.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996. "Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 290-311, August.
    2. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    3. repec:tiu:tiutis:fc1a6ca3-d618-4bc5-a115-fcf8846545bf is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    5. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Prat & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Games Played Through Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 989-1026, July.
    2. Kirchsteiger, G. & Prat, A., 1999. "Common Agency and Computational Complexity : Theory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper 1999-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Calzolari, Giacomo & Pavan, Alessandro, 2006. "On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 168-204, September.
    4. Peters, Michael, 2003. "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-109, July.
    5. V. Bhaskar & Nikita Roketskiy, 2021. "Consumer privacy and serial monopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 917-944, December.
    6. Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolo, Vincenzo, 2020. "Exploiting rivals' strengths," CEPR Discussion Papers 15520, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    8. Yong Chao, 2013. "Strategic Effects Of Three‐Part Tariffs Under Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 977-1015, August.

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