Moral hazard with discrete soft information
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- Guillaume Roger, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Discrete Soft Information," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 89(287), pages 545-555, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
moral hazard; asymmetric information; soft information; contract; mechanism; audit.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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